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This paper is dedicated to viewpoints propositions (VPPs), 
a (lexically triggered) non-truth conditional component of 
sentences. A VPP introduced by a sentence denotes a 
Platonic (non necessarily embodied) viewpoint on the 
denotatum of this sentence. Unlike conventional implica-
tures, VPPs are not necessarily consciously processed by 
speakers and interpreters. The possibility that unconscious 
processing of VPPs during the utterance retroacts on 
thoughts is examined. 
„The nominatum of a proper name is the object itself 
which is designated thereby; the image which we may 
have along with it is quite subjective; the sense lies in 
between, not subjective as is the image, but not the 
object either. The following simile may help in elucidat-
ing these relationships. Someone observes the moon 
through a telescope. The moon is comparable with the 
nominatum: it is the object of the observation which is 
mediated through the real image projected by the object 
lens into the interior of the telescope; and through the 
retinal image of the observer. The first may be compare 
with the sense, the second with the presentation (or 
image in the psychological sense). The real image inside 
the telescope, however, is relative: it depends upon the 
standpoint, yet, it is objective in that it can serve several 
observers. (...) But every one of them would have only 
his own retinal image“. Frege, On Sense and Nomi-
natum 
1. Introduction 
Non Truth-Conditional Semantics is nearly entirely 
dedicated to the study of conversational or conventional 
implicatures. This paper explores (rather sketchily) another 
type of non truth-conditional semantic component of 
sentences. To illustrate the phenomenon, French native 
speakers were submitted two sentences depicting the 
scene of telescope viewing that Frege resorts to in the 
quotation above. Formally, the two sentences differ only by 
the preposition introducing the locative complement. 
Following French dictionaries, the two prepositions are 
synonymous; the use of the second one is more con-
strained and not easily translated in English:  
(1)Pierre   regarde   la    lune  à   travers   le    télescope. 
 Peter is-looking-at the moon at through  the  telescope. 
‘Peter is looking at the moon right through the telescope’ 
(2) Pierre   regarde     la    lune    au     travers     du     téle- 
                                                                                   scope. 
    Peter is-looking-at the moon at-the through of-the tele- 
                                                                                   scope. 
‘Peter is looking at the moon through/despite of the 
telescope’ 
At first sight, speakers find (2) quite strange (they do not 
have problem with (1)). But when provided with a context 
where the telescope forms a visual obstacle to the moon 
(because it is dirty for instance), they always judge that the 
acceptability of (2) increases. Great readers generally find 
the restriction P imponed by the preposition “au travers de” 
by themselves. P says roughly “The telescope acts as a 
visual filter the sight must penetrate in order to see the 
moon” (see Martin & Dominicy 2001a & b for details). P is 
an adaptation of the more abstract proposition ruling the 
use of “au travers de“ (“There is an obstacle to the 
perception of the object under observation”). 
The central questions which will be dealt with are the 
semantic and epistemic status of P. Clearly, P does not 
pertain to the truth conditions of the sentence. (2) will be 
judged true exactly under the same conditions as (1), 
which does not convey P. P resembles very much a 
conventional implicature (CI). Indeed, P, like CIs, arises 
only because of the (non-truth conditional) properties of a 
word and cannot be explained in terms of conversational 
rules. P, like CIs, is detachable, since it is possible to 
denote the same thing without conveying P (see (1)). P, as 
CIs, survives under presupposition holes, e.g. negation, 
(like presuppositions).1 For instance, the utterance of the 
sentence (4) containing the hole possibly commits the 
speaker to the CIs (5a-b) triggered by even exactly as (3). 
In the same way, P is presumed by the utterance of (6) 
exactly as for the utterance of (2): 
(3)  Even Bill likes Mary. 
(4)  Possibly even Bill likes Mary. 
(5)  a. Other people besides Bill like Mary. 
 b. Of the people under consideration, Bill   
   is the least likely to like Mary. 
(6)  Possibly Peter is looking at the moon au travers 
du telescope. 
But something revealed by the experience reported above 
prevents from analyzing P as a CI. Recall that most 
speakers do not judge (2) grammatical (since telescopes 
are not conceived as visual obstacle out of the blue) but 
find it perfect when provided with a context satisfying P. 
On the contrary, (3) will be judged grammatical even in a 
context falsifying (5). We explain the spontaneous 
judgement on the grammaticality of (2) if we conjecture 
that speakers are not conscious of P, neither as producer 
or interpreter. If they were indeed, we would expect them 
to find a context satisfying P by themselves, as for (3) or 
(4). On this point, P is very different from CIs. The 
literature is not explicit on it, but it is obvious that CIs are 
generally not conceived as infraliminar propositions. The 
fact that CIs are generally consciously interpreted explains 
why the speaker can use them to convey the main point of 
the utterance2 (like conversational implicatures, see 
Gazdar 1979, 41), which is the case e.g. if he does not 
want this point to be further discussed, or why CIs can give 
rise to sarcastic effects (see Karttunen & Peters 1979, 
hence KP, fn pp. 8-9) – ironizing on the basis of uncon-
scious propositions does not pay very well. Some 
selectional restrictions of verbs, sometimes classed as CIs 
(see e.g. KP), sometimes as presuppositions (see e.g. 
Corblin 2003), can also serve as the main point of the 
                                                     
1 Even has also been analyzed as a presupposition-trigger before and after 
KP. As the difference between CI and presuppositions does not matter for our 
line of argumentation, we leave this point apart (see Gazdar 1979 for details).  
2 Potts (t.a. :2) states that CIs are « secondary entailments that cooperative 
speakers rarely use to express controversial propositions or carry the main 
themes of a discourse ». Potts seems to neglect here the difference between 
road regulations and the regularities in drivers’ behavior. 
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utterance or give rise to ironic effects. For instance, one 
can say Peter likes Mary precisely to indicate that Peter is 
acquainted with Mary, or I’ve drunk some cheese to 
indicate ironically that the cheese served was really too 
liquid. This is possible because speakers consciously 
convey and interpret the selectional restrictions at hand. 
The case of “hidden propositions” (cf. Martin 2002, 
Dominicy & Martin 2003) like P is entirely different. As 
insinuation and suggestion seem to pertain to the deep 
nature of CIs – a role that cannot be felicitously fulfilled by 
propositions generally processed unconsciously – we 
would lose an important generalization in classing 
propositions as P in the set of CIs.  
P is not a presupposition either, since the utterance of 
(2) does not require P to be true in order for the utterance 
to have a truth value. Besides, presuppositions can also 
convey the main point of the utterance (see e.g. at least 
some kinds of accomodation).  
2. Viewpoint Propositions 
As P does not enter any existing category, it seems 
justified to introduce a new subspecies in the typology of 
non truth-conditional semantic components of sentences. 
Before proposing a definition, it is worth emphasizing that 
items triggering propositions like P do not reduce to a 
handful of prepositions. Actually, they seem to pervade all 
the lexicon. In order to check that, one only needs to 
notice the laborious efforts lexicographers dedicate to 
excavating deep selectional restrictions of words.  
I shall say that a sentence containing an item like «au 
travers de» introduce a compulsory viewpoint on its 
denominatum through a viewpoint proposition (VPP). I will 
loosely say that the sentence containing a viewpoint-
trigger like «au travers de» introduces a VPP (obviously, it 
does not denote it). The sentence does not need to be 
uttered (in a certain context) in order to introduce its VPP. 
The VPP denotes a way of representing certain aspects of 
the denotatum of the sentence; it impones this viewpoint 
independently of the subjective representation of the 
speaker. VPPs do not need a bearer to exist. Other people 
can obey them in forming their representation of the 
denotatum as much as the speaker. VPPs determine 
Platonic stances on the denotatum, social viewpoints that 
can be embodied or not.  
The fact that some semantic components of sentences 
are not consciously triggered or interpreted is not very 
surprising. It is common to have a procedural knowledge 
without having the corresponding propositional knowledge. 
Speakers can implicitly learn the specific difference of 
contexts satisfying the introduced VPP, without knowing 
that the sentence introduces the VPP nor knowing that 
VPP. Children’s utterances illustrate well the point. 
Everybody has been once confused by the huge gap 
between the accuracy a child can display while talking 
about a situation on the one hand, and the implausibility 
that he can adopt the perspective generally associated 
with the expression he used on the other. What happens in 
this case is that the child has formed a generalization upon 
the use of a given expression on the basis of statistical 
regularities, and recognizes – rightly or not – an instance 
as belonging to the type of context which satisfies the 
expression, but doesn’t grasp the corresponding VPP 
consciously. The enjoyment adults have while attending 
these events is partly due to the fact that witnessing this 
gap unveils either what is already there without being  
 
noticed (if the child was right), or what could have been 
there (if the child was wrong with perspicacity). On this 
point, children are rightly called poets, since poets often try 
to bring to light the way words pre-construe the represen-
tation of reality. They make notice humdrum and thus 
invisible perspectives in prolonging and extending them 
(see e. g. (Jaccottet 2002 [1970], 66) – as a musician 
holding a note – or in using the lexicon in a deviant way 
(see e.g. (Eikhenbaum 1965, 62)).  
The little experiment reported above suggests that the 
more well-read the subject is, the more he likely is to grasp 
the VPPs consciously. As we do not want to say that the 
meaning of words co-varies with the speaker, we are 
committed to say that if the VPP is consciously processed 
by some speakers, it is ‘introduced’ by the sentence even if 
the speaker does not know it. 
3. Do you believe the same thing after 
having said it? 
We may conjecture that when a speaker utters a sentence 
introducing the VPP P, the lexical choices he made, 
perhaps unconsciously, is caused by, and therefore 
reflects, his own representation of the state of affairs at 
hand. However, once a difference is made between the 
social viewpoint conveyed by the lexicon and the one the 
speaker entertains as an individual, it is theoretically 
possible that whereas he introduces P unconsciously 
through its (sincere) utterance of the sentence, he (i) 
judges P false or can discover that P is false, or (ii) is 
agnostic about P, or (iii) has no belief about P. Let us 
assume that when P is unconsciously introduced, native 
speakers and interpreters do process it at a certain level – 
in a deaf, dumb, and blind way. In the case (i), the speaker 
has expressed itself badly, and consequently can feel 
helplessy troubled. If the interpreter is also in state (i), he 
can feel a particularly subdued discomfort: as unconscious 
propositions cannot be explicitly rejected, the troublesome 
P may pass automatically into his commitment store (cf. 
Hamblin 1970, Corblin 2003). Cases (ii) and (iii) are the 
most interesting one. We may conjecture that in choosing 
(perhaps partially by chance) an item triggering P, the 
speaker, while processing its own utterance, eliminates the 
representations falsifying P he entertains before its 
utterance (case (ii)) or disminishes the probability to 
entertain them in the future (case (iii)). This is at least what 
we expect if the system tends to maximize the consistency 
between what is (unconsciously) meant and represented. 
The fact that more generally, verbalization retroacts on 
thoughts is confirmed by an experience reported in 
(Schooler & Schooler 1990). This experience shows that 
verbalizing the appearance of previously seen visual 
stimuli impaired subsequent recognition performance. 
Subjects who verbalized the face performed less well on a 
subsequent recognition test than control subjects who did 
not engage in memory verbalization. Bartlett already 
reported that subjects who repeatedly described previously 
seen face drawings were reportedly surprised by the 
appearance of the original drawings (reported in Schooler 
& Schooler 1990, 43). If the truth-conditional aspects of 
verbalized sentences, which are generally consciously 
processed by the speaker, already alter memory, we can 
imagine that unconscious components of sentences can 
also act (even minimally) upon the viewpoint the speaker 
has on the denotatum of its memorizing. It might be 
intereresting to consider testimonies on this perspective.  
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4. Conclusions 
Why natural languages would be such that parts of the 
information conveyed by sentences stay beyond the 
control of the speakers? On the one hand, it seems 
counter-adaptative indeed, since viewpoints unconsciously 
triggered can act upon the interaction in a way contrary to 
the preferences of the speaker. Culture is in this sense an 
adaptative tool, since it permits the Private Ego to take 
over its Inconscious or Social Ego, to manipulate better not 
so well-read Alters (at least if getting rid of beliefs induced 
unconsciously is more difficult), and to know how not so 
well-read Alters conceive the world even better than 
themselves. On the other hand, it can be argued that the 
existence of a set of unconscious and thus not easily 
controlled pre-conceptions of the world strengthens social 
cohesion3 and puts an ecological limit on inter-individual 
cheating. 
                                                     
3 The problem of VPP is obviously related to the Sapir-Whorf question. It is 
very likely that the set of VPP buried in the lexicon varies partly from one 
natural language to another. But as Marc Dominicy notices, the existence of 
VPPs would raise the same questions even if there was only one natural 
language. 
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